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Background-Google Hacking
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Google Dorks
Eigenpages: dangerous pages that can disclose server vulnerabilities
Google is a great tool for Hackers!!!
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Malicious Queries
Sensitive pages
Locate & Exploit Vulnerable Servers
Background-Search Worm
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Infected Server Vulnerable Sever Vulnerable Server
Locate & Exploit Locate & Exploit
Search Worm: a worm uses search engines to locate targets
Example:
Santy:  targeting phpBB bulletin system.
Google Dork: allinurl: viewtopic.php
Released on 12/20/2004, infected 40,000 servers in 2 days
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Motivation
 Search Worms are dangerous! So, It deservers 
our research.
 Two common problems in the field of worm 
studying:
 How to model the propagation of such worms ?
(I(t) = ?)
 Study the spreading characteristics
 Study the effects of containment strategies
 How to contain the propagation of such worms?
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Topic 1
Modeling of Search Worms
Modeling of the Search Worms
A virtual search worm
 Vulnerable severs leak eigenpages containing specific keywords 
to search engine.
N: num of severs containing the eigenpages (Suspicious 
severs)
V: num of really exploitable severs (Vulnerable servers)
 Propagation steps of infected severs:
1. Search "special-keywords and random-keywords" in a 
search engine  m search results
2. Choose δ pages among the total m search results to 
scan.
3. Once a server is infected, it begins this infection cycle, 
too.
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Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Eigenpage Distribution
 Obviously, severs contain more eigenpages are 
more likely to be exploited.
 Two attacker-favorable assumptions:
 m search results are randomly selected from all 
the eigenpages on the web
 δ targets are randomly selected from the m
search results
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Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Eigenpage Distribution
 U-Model: eigenpages are uniformly distributed 
on severs
The number of infected servers by the end of 
time tick t:
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The probability that
a specific server is
hit by a scan during
the time tick t
Remained vulnerable
severs by the end of
the time tick t-1
V is the total count of servers really suffering the vulnerabilities
among the N severs containing eigenpages
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Newly infected 
severs during 
the time tick t
Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Eigenpage Distribution
 PL-Model: eigenpages follow a power law 
distribution. 
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The probability that the number
of eigenpages p on a suspicious server is greater than x is
N suspicious 
servers
10 pages 100 pages 10^k pages
Divided into k groups
 9/22
Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Eigenpage Distribution
 PL-Model:
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Time to infect 
95% vulnerable 
severs for the 
PL-Model
Newly infected severs in the i-th group
during the time tick t
U-Model
Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Eigenpage Distribution
 Proposition:
Among different distributions of eigenpages, 
the uniform distribution optimizes the 
performance of search worms.
We proved this conclusion by using the mean 
value inequality 
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Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Page Ranking
 Search results are ranked according to Keyword 
relevance, page importance….
 Pages on popular servers are more likely to appear in 
front scan collisions.
 If the second attacker-favorable assumption is true, no 
scan collisions. 
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However, the second assumption is impossible, the propagation of 
search worm will be affected by page ranking
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Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Page Ranking
 Page importance: 
 Page Ranking Value (0-10)
Power Law [Litvak 2007]
 Site importance 
We simply assume servers contain more pages 
are more important
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[Litvak 2007] Litvak, N., Scheinhardt, W. R. W., Volkovich, Y.: In-degree and PageRank: 
Why do they follow similar power laws? Internet Math, Vol.4(2-3), pp.175-198 (2007)
Modeling of the Search Worms
Effects of Page Ranking
 PR-Model:
An infected server selects the δ top-ranking 
search results to scan
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Page ranking slows down
the spreading of the search
worm
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Topic 2:
Containment of Search Worms
Containment of the Search Worm
 The goal to model the search worm is to help 
developing an efficient containment system.
 We introduce a conceptual containment system 
based on honey-page insertion.
 We use our propagation models to analyze this 
system.
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Containment of the Search Worm
 Honey Page
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This is a honey page pointing to a honey pot
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Containment of the Search Worm
 Containment based on honey-page insertion:
Search engine randomly inserts honey-pages into search results for 
any query.
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Victim
Honey Pot
Exploit
Alert
When the search engine receives an alert, it denies further 
queries form detected victims
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Containment of the Search Worm
 Is such a strategy possible?
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Honey page insert rate
Probability that an infected sever scans a honey 
page during an infection cycle
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An infected sever can be induced to 
scan honeypots in a very short time 
after it is infected even if the insert 
rate is very small.
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# of detected infected 
nodes by the time t+1
Containment of the Search Worm
 Two questions:
 Containment requirement  Insert Rate?
 Is arbitrary requirement can be reached?
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γ is the final prevalence rate: 
ration of infected vulnerable 
servers
1≤εδ No limitation, arbitrary requirement can be reached
is the density of vulnerable servers.N
V
=ε
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Containment of the Search Worm
 Effectiveness for the Santy worm
N=6,000,000    V=40,000
To contain the final prevalence rate below 1%
Insert rate  0.011
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2 honey pages in every 100 
search results can stop the 
spreading of the Santy worm 
at its early age!
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Conclusion
 Modeling of the Search Worm
 Eigenpages Distribution: Uniform distribution 
optimizes the spreading
 Page Ranking: slow downs the spreading
 Containment of the Search Worm
 Honey page insertion
 A small insert rate can lead a good containment 
effect           
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Challenging Future Work
 Worm may validate the truth of the 
search results. Then, how to disguise 
honey pages as true ones both in URL 
and contents?
 Our current conclusions are based on 
simulation. Real experiments are 
required to verify them.
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Question & Answer
Thanks for your attention!
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